كتب دروس في فلسفة الدين دراسات تساؤلات القراء حوارات مطبوعات كتابات ذات صلة
(بديلا من علم الكلام)
Religious Reformation and Islamic Education
By Abu Yaareb Marzouki
Introduction:
Muslim Unity, as a religious and ethical bond, is the highest spiritual end. It should be, as political and economical solidarity, the highest temporal means without which Islam’s role in the universal history will be reduced to naught. The realization of the relationship between these two dimensions of Islamic Unity and the achievement of its requirements constitute the principal stake of the Sòòòahwa ÇáÕÍæÉ (=The Awakening). We will try, in this paper, to answer two questions related to the pathologies of our ethical will and rational awareness whose characteristics have corrupted the Islamic Education and hence consolidated the intellectual and institutional decline and enhanced the disunion of Islamic mind and reality .
This tentative essay elaborates on the theoretical and practical diagnoses proposed by four of our great thinkers, two of whom have systematically dealt with the theoretical dimension of the problem: al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd[1]. The two others systematically scrutinized the practical dimension: Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Khaldun[2].
Our purpose, in this paper, is to understand the overwhelming consequences of the reactive attitude towards the exogenous factors, which define the thought and action of both those who adopt these factors and those who refuse them, without finding out the universal principle of creativity in any genuine culture[3]. Applied to the current situation of our intellectual and institutional history, this characterization seems doubtless. Nobody can dispute the aggravation of this reactive attitude and the dependence implied by it, at the levels of the intellectual and institutional dispositions of our present culture. This reactive attitude is either an imitative aping[4] of the exogenous factors, or a repetitive aping[5] of our proper past. These, I believe, are the two ethical and existential pathologies, which have crippled our historical ambitions, eliminated any possibility of genuine experience and ipso facto any possibility of innovation and creation in our modern history.
The Muslim elite of our time should acknowledge that this debate is crucial. It continues to be determinant, because the current crisis cannot be overcome unless we radically tackle these pathologies. We should have the courageous attitude of the abovementioned philosophers, in order to deepen their analysis and propose radical solutions able to reinstate the spirit of historic enterprise as sine qua non condition for any innovation and creativity. Indeed, we cannot get rid of dependence as a permanent mental and cultural structure whose causes are deeper than the current conjuncture of our relationship with the modern West, unless we trace back the causes of the breakdown of Islamic creativity, which is identical with the principle of Islamic Unity[6].
As a matter of fact, the reactive attitude and the dependence implied by it are not new, because, as we will see, they derive either wittingly or unwittingly from both the misunderstanding of Islamic theoretical and practical visions and the historical neutralization of this vision due to the antagonistic formation of our theoretical and practical sciences and their applications[7].
1-We should courageously acknowledge that every serious evolution in our thought and action (their institutions, too), after the event of the prophetic mission, was overwhelmingly characterized by a reactive attitude to exogenous factors. Rarely can one find an action stemming from the endogenous ones, i.e., in accordance with the injunctions of Islam itself, because these factors were either ignored or neglected.
2-We should continue the effort of the thinkers we have mentioned in order to define the deep cause of this behavior and avoid that the future development of our thought and action (their institutions, too) continue to be a superficial struggle oscillating between a reactive refusal and a reactive imitation of the creation other civilizations or our proper past have strived to produce, or both.
These painful pathologies are not unrelated to the problem of disunion of our Ummah. Indeed, the continual refusal of addressing them, determines the very roots of its spiritual and political disunion. This paper assumes that the auto-hindrance of Islamic theoretical and practical Revolutions is the very root of the Islamic spiritual and political disunity. We believe that tracing back the courageous beginning of the diagnoses defined by our great thinkers is the necessary condition of a progressive and active unification of our mind and reality. We will address this hindrance in two steps as following:
I.1. How Islam, as continual reformation, has been hindered, till the breakdown of the principle of creativity of Islamic Ummah?
I.2. Why to be a continual reformation, is the unique possibility for Islam to fit its revolutionary characteristics?
The first step will try to determine the deep causes, which have hindered the Continual Reformation especially via the deviation of our educational institution, in order to revive the favorable conditions of the Islamic Revolution. The Reinstatement of Islamic theoretical and practical Revolution as continual reformation is able to whet the principle of vitality and creativity and consequently guarantee the fundamental lever of Islamic Union
The second step will try to define the Meaning of Islamic Revolution as continual reformation and the possibilities of the renewal, which will enable this continual reformation. The understanding of the characteristics of this very revolution can help understand the obstacles, and revive the Islamic theoretical and practical Revolutions and consequently generate the Islamic spiritual and moral union as sine qua non condition of the Islamic cultural and political union.
First step
How the continual reformation has been hindered till the breakdown of the
principle of creativity of Islamic Ummah?
The revolutionary character of Islamic continual reformation is not easily comprehensible nor is its application a straightforward process[8]. By the relationship it has defined between the religious transcendent ends and their historical means Islam has defined the achievement of Islamic values by an ascendant historical process alternative to the opposite conception which consider the human future as continual moving away from a golden age ending up in a necessary decline. The ascendant process Islam has proposed is based on tow notions derived from the same Arabic term: Ì.å.Ï. = (j.h.d.)=Effort. The first notion is the very essence of the applied theoretical and practical reasons: Jihād. The second is Ijtihād, which represents the essence of the abstract theoretical and practical reasons.
The inversion of Islami vision of history has excluded the possibility of any serious epistemological and ethical implementations of these two notions. This is why we need to unveil the historical and conceptual causes of this unfortunate inversion. Our quest, thus, will be historical and conceptual:
Historical investigation:
The historical investigation may be illustrated by the institutional borrowing which has overwhelmingly defined almost all our institutions. This receptive attitude was the result of both an urgency for action before a sound theoretical foundation and a universal confusion between al-Barā`a al-AsliyyahÇáÈÑÇÁÉ ÇáÃÕáíÉ (values are produced by human judgement) and "Istisäāb al-äāl"ÇÓÊÕÍÇÈ ÇáÍÇá[9] (the man should accept things as they exist). This institutional illustration may be confirmed by the legal Ijtihad as general behavior, whereby our scholars legitimize a posteriori by a far fetched justification, the adoption of the existent solutions proposed by other cultures, after initial resistance and refusal.
This attitude began since the adoption of the institutions of the Byzantine and Persian empires and lasted till the late adoption of the western organization of all aspects of our life and above all our political, educational and economical systems, let alone the content and the form of our theoretical and practical thoughts. The reason is evidently the break down of Islamic theoretical creativity and practical innovation. No past era of Islamic civilization, after the prophetic period, can be a refuge against alien influence. All our intellectual and institutional past adopted this very attitude, which has ended up contaminating the deepest bottom of our soul and led it in an absolutely unfounded chaotic theoretical and practical borrowing[10]. We believe that this attitude constitutes the fundamental cause of Islamic disunion:
A- The theoretical borrowing may be qualified as Istishab al-hal al `Aqadi. As a matter of fact, Usul ad-Din ( foundation of religious dogmas) became the defense of dogmatic formulations of the credo, as a vision of the Truth[11], instead of being the continual seeking of the truth: at-Tawāsi bil-Haqq.
The result of this theoretical “tahreef” was the maiming of Islamic theoretical reason, as illustrated by the following consequences:
1-The suppression of all spiritual creativity: negation of imagination as source of symbolic production of scientific theories and fines arts. The exclusion of Sciences and fines Arts from the dignity of spiritual activity has doubly maimed Islamic spirituality: Muslims have renounced these fields to alien peoples and minorities, and these fields became irreligious. Being inscribed in human nature sciences and arts can never be eliminated; their interdiction or degradation can eliminate only their religious dimension.
2-The suppression of all material creativity: negation of imagination as source of technical production of material institutions and mechanical arts. The same behavior has been adopted towards the second craft of the theoretical reason: it became an activity related to magicians and charlatans.
3-But the most dangerous consequence was the disunion of Muslims. Reduced to the defense of credo-dogma the theoretical knowledge cannot be but the source of an absolute spiritual disorder: the multiplication of dogmatic formulations of the credo is the first cause of the disunity of our Ummah.
B- The practical borrowing may be qualified as Istishab al-hal al Shar`i. Indeed, Usul ul Fiqh (foundation of religious laws of shari’a) became the defense of a dogmatic formulation of the law as a vision of the Right, instead of being the continual search or justice and the conditions of its implementation: at-Tawāsi bis-Sabr.
The result of this practical “tahreef” was the maiming of Islamic practical reason, as illustrated by the following consequences:
1-The suppression of all ethical creativity: The negation of imagination as source of symbolic production of ethical theories and fines manners is clearly represented in the notion of Bid`ah which became the very root of an absolute conservatism and conformism in all aspects of life.
2-The suppression of all institutional creativity: The negation of the imagination as source of institutional production of civil institutions and political organizations does not need any further demonstration.
3-Furthermore, the defense of law-dogma cannot be but a source of an absolute institutional disorder: the multiplication of dogmatic foundations of the laws is the second cause of the Islamic disunity, because these multiple foundations were not considered as simple doctrinal and scientific theories but source of behavioral oppositions between madahib and consequently source of civil unrest.
The Islah trend has tried to liberate Islamic theoretical and practical thought of the superficial manifestations of these consequences. But the solution it has adopted was an eclectic syncretism, which addresses only the phenomenal appearances of the third kinds of consequences: the multiplicity of the theological schools and legal doctrines. It is motivated solely by pragmatic and untheoretical reasons: alleviate some appearances and respond to an urgent task i.e. the formation of a front against the colonizer. But it was unable to tackle the real and deep crisis,[12] because the very root of the problem has not been addressed: the suppression of the functions the theoretical and practical reasons should achieve to meet the definition of Ijtihād and Jihad as conceived of by the Islamic Revolution i.e. the Continual Reformation.
Conceptual demonstration:
How this suppression of the functions of the theoretical and practical imagination as principal devices reason uses to achieve its role, could be understood, in a religion which consider them as the underpinning of the faith i.e. Ijtihād or Tawāsi bil-Haqq and Jihād or Tawāsi bis-Sabr[13]?
The unique explanation possible of these consequences should be found in the reinstatement of the authorities the abolition of which has been a necessary condition of the Ijtihād and Jihād formulations of the function of the theoretical and practical reasons. In order to prevent the misuse of the spiritual authority as mediation between man and God, Islam has created the institution of Ijtihād, provided we construe it as defined by its deep meaning obliterated by this reinstatement of the spiritual authority. The misuse of the material authority of domination could be prevented if Muslims have implemented the institution of Jihād as outlined by its deep meaning suppressed by this reinstatement.
Hence the revolutionary role of Ijtihād and Jihād became void and cadcuous by the simple elimination of the functions of the theoretical and practical reasons, i.e. the role of imagination:
Revolutionary role of Ijtihād:
a- Negatively, this role can be defined as an alternative to an exclusive institution corrupted religious castes have made intermediary between man and God. They pretend that the spiritual authority is infallible and can assume the personal responsibilities of the believers in the field of knowledge and faith.
b- Positively, Ijtihād can be defined as a new vision of knowledge where the criterion of truth is not the adequacy with an alleged objective reality but the consensus and the practice of the believers, defined by the rational and ethical behavior: at-tawāsi bil-Haqq.
Revolutionary role of Jihād:
a- Negatively this role can be defined as an alternative to an exclusive institution corrupted political castes pretend intermediary between man and God presenting it as a political authority infallible in the field of action.
b- Positively this role can be defined as a new vision of action where the criterion of good is not the adequacy to an alleged objective value, but the consensus and the practice of the believers defined by the rational and ethical behavior: at-tawasi bis-Sabr.
If the reinstatement of these authorities, which has begun by a double malefic reduction, has happened since the first phase of our history, it must be conceptually inescapable for two reasons each of which encourages the adoption of the solutions yet existent in other civilizations, and substitutes the intellectual and institutional borrowing for intellectual innovation and institutional creation:
1- The alleged preeminence of action excludes any possibilities for the first generations of Muslims to grasp all the consequences of the abolition of the institutions which are by definition source of misuse and the proposal of intellectual and institutional solutions able to avoid the moral and material corruption.
They need to reestablish them in order to deal pragmatically with the improvised situations. The Shi`ah have chosen the reestablishment of the spiritual authority de jure. The Sunnah, have chosen to reestablish it de facto. The Khawarij, for whom every good Muslim is virtually Imam, have chosen to universalize the Shi`i solution. The Mu`tazilah, for whom every reasonable man is ipsu facto able to know the good and the evil, have chosen to universalize the Sunni solution.
2- But the concrete determination of alternative institutions to those abolished by Islam, must be a historic theoretical and practical process and consequently a continual reformation wherein the religious aspect of the theoretical and practical knowledge and their institutions are not bound to a determinate content but related to a universal purpose and general form. This indetermination was too risky, dangerous and, consequently, unbearable when the theoretical development of the thought is immature. Hence, the petrifaction of the two couple of solutions was the unique solution possible: Ahlu as-Sunnah (Dhawu Al-Ahliyyah wash-Shawkah) and their Mu`tazilite opposition (Kullu dhi`Aql) and the Shi`ah (Divine Right of Àhlil-Beit) and their Khārijite opposition (Al-Ardhu yarithuhā `Ibāduna as-Slihun)[14] could not evolve without the intellectual and moral courage to go to the bottom of the principle of legitimacy of the spiritual and political authorities.
Instead of that courage, the facile solution conceptually possible was negatively Sadd adh-Dharai` and positively the borrowing of any given solution, in order to avoid the risky possibilities of chaos and anarchy stemming from the indetermination revolutionary Islamic solutions imply if their requirements are not theoretically deduced (Ijtihād) and practically implemented (Jihād). Being grounded on a generalization of interdiction alternative to the Islamic principle of the generalization of permission, Sadd adh-Dharai` coincides with the reestablishment of the authorities Islam has abolished. The reestablishment will be possible via the systematic borrowing of the two empires of the time, as Muslims have done during the last century: superficial “legal” justification of the adoption of socialism or capitalism via the casuistic fatawah as false thought neutralizing any genuine philosophical and religious foundation.
The interdiction, which is the easier solution, begins with the double reduction of the revolutionary alternative institutions proposed by Islam:
a- Objective reduction: Ijtihād and Jihād are reduced to their narrower objective meanings: legal Ijtihād, martial Jihād. This objective restriction implies that Ijtihād will be reduced to the unique science of religious laws, without the sciences whose subject matters are the things for which the fiqh may legislate. It implies also that Jihād will be reduced to the unique task of holy war without the mediate and immediate means, which achieve the conditions of success in any war, holy or otherwise.
b- Subjective reduction: Ijtihād and Jihād are reduced to their narrower subjective meaning: Ijtihād and Jihād became particular religious obligation “fardhu kifayah”. This subjective restriction implies that Ijtihād will be reduced to a unique particular obligation of lawyers (fardhu kifayah) who will become a religious authority and substitute to the universal obligation (farãu `Ayn) whereby every believer must seek knowledge. It implies also that Jihād will be reduced to a unique particular obligation of warriors (fardhu kifayah) who will become a political caste (the mamluks) or military Janissaries as substitute to the universal function of citizen’s self-defense.
The first reduction has eliminated all theoretical and practical sciences (Ijtihād) and their esthetical, technical and ethical applications (Jihād). The second reduction has eliminated the universal commitment of all Muslims in the life of the community: the Fuqahā‛ and the mercenary castes have stripped the citizens of all theoretical and practical contributions. Therefore, we should avoid the objective and subjective restrictions of the institutions of Ijtihād and Jihād, in order not to return to the traditional vision of the religion, Islam has described as corrupted: Muharrafah. The negative and positive definitions of these two institutions are safe guards against the corruption which has grounded a double restriction of Ijtihād and Jihād
Second step
Why to be a continual reformation, is the unique possibility for Islam to
fit its revolutionary characteristics?
The purpose is to analyze the Islamic theoretical and practical revolution and to interpret our thought and institutions in relation to the functions they must achieve, as Islam commends so that the conditions of a free and powerful society obtain. This understanding will enable us to grasp the revolutionary meaning of Islam.
Islam is not a simple continuation of the religious traditions as misunderstood by those who have doctrinally adopted the Isra‛iliyāt, the Nasraniyāt, the Sabi`iyāt, the Mājusiyyat and the Mushrikiyyāt[15], or by those who have institutionally aped the political, educational and social organization of the two empires of the era. It is a genuine deconstruction of these doctrinal and institutional traditions via two concepts[16]: Tahreef or corruption of religious thought and action and Jahiliyyh or corruption of natural thought and action.
The concept of tahreef should be construed as an islamic critical deconstruction of the dogmatic traditions which have crippled the theoretical and practical revealed knowledge and petrified the institutions implied by it.
The concept of Jāhiliyyah should be construed as a critical deconstruction of the dogmatic traditions, which have maimed the theoretical and practical rational knowledge and corrupted the institutions grounded on it.
By these two critical concepts of Tahreef and Jāhiliyyah and their institutional consequences, Islam has tried to renew the religious and philosophical thought[17] and to define the alternative institutions able to avoid the corruption of the spiritual and political authorities. These alternative solutions it has proposed cannot be but a continual reformation of the theoretical and practical thought both at the level of abstract thinking (Ijtihād) and at the level of its concrete implementation (Jihād).
Deduction[18] of the concept of continual reformation:
As consequence of the full realization of the Revelation "Khatm al-Wahyi" and of the abolition of all spiritual authorities mediating between the believer and God Islam qua Islam, must be a continual reformation, i.e.[19]:
1- Islam should be a continual theoretical and practical knowledge, or Ijtihād which, if institutionalized, must give birth to a social and formal institution one can rename: Mu‛asasat al-Tawāsi bil-Haqq[20]. Our purpose, in continuity with the theoretical effort of our philosophers, is to understand the historical fact according to which this theoretical thought has been reduced before the era of decline to the legal dimension and since the Sahwa to the political thought of religious parties, without the conditions which render effective these meanings.
2- Islam should be a continual theoretical and practical action or a continual Jihād grounded on the meticulous application of the theoretical and practical knowledge, which, if institutionalized, must be a social and formal institution one can rename: Mu‛asast at-Tawāsi bis-Sabr[21]. Our purpose, according to the same continuation, is to understand the historical fact according to which this practical thought has been reduced till the era of decline to solely the practice of the religious obligations or `Ibadah, and since the Sahwa, to the practice of holy war, without the conditions, which render effective these meanings.
The deep meaning of Ijtihād as epistemological (the criterion of truth) and ontological (the nature of truth,) condition of Islamic intellectual and institutional revolution, has been omitted. It has been reduced before the era of decline to Usull al Fiqh, and since the Sahwa, to politics, both reduction being absolutely unaware of their conditions and means. Ijtihād should be more universal than the legal methodology. It should have five dimensions: the traditional two kinds to which we add two others related to the conditions of their possibility. These four meanings should be grounded on the general principle of Ijtihād, i.e. the principle of the intellectual attribute of the human being: the theoretical reason as absolute free power.
Hence, we should sort out the following kinds of Ijthihād: 1-al-Ijtihad al-Asghar (or legal Ijtihād), 2- al-Ijtihād al-Akbar (or religious ethics), 3-al-Ijtihād al-Åaghir or the Ijtihad which realizes the conditions and means of the Ijtihād al-Asghar (theoretical knowledge: natural sciences, the man as natural being included), 4-al-Ijtihād al-Kabir or the Ijtihād which realize the conditions and means of the Ijtihād al-Akbar (the practical knowledge: moral sciences including nature as moral being), 5-and the principle of all Ijtihād, or the conditions of enlightened reason as tawāsá bil-Haqq.
The deep meaning of the Jihād as axiological (the nature of truthfulness or moral value) and ethical (the criterion of truthfulness or moral value) has also been omitted. This is why Jihad has been reduced before the era of decline to the religious obligations and since the Sahwa to the holy war, both without their conditions and means. The Jihad should be more universal than its martial connotation. It should have five dimensions: the traditional two kinds and two others related to the conditions of their possibility and the principle of Jihad in general, i.e. the principle of the ethical attribute of the human being: the practical reason as free will.
Hence, we should distinguish the following kinds of Jihād: 1- al-Jihad al-Asghar (holy war), 2- al-Jihad al-Akbar (`Ibadah or ethical action), 3- al-Jihād al-Saghir or the Jihad which achieves the conditions and means of the Jihād al-Asghar (Technology and economics or the application of the theoretical sciences), 4- al-Jihād al-Kabir or the Jihād which achieves the conditions and means of the Jihād al-Akbar (Politics and Education or the application of moral sciences) 5-and the principle of all Jihad: the free will as tawasi bis-Sabr.
These deep meanings of the alternative solutions proposed by Islam in order to organize human thought and action imply a new vision of the institutions able to produce the conditions and means of their concrete and gradual achievement in the social reality during the historical existence of the Ummah.
If we adopt Ibn Khaldun`s analysis of `Umran, we can tell the constituents of its form represented by the educational and political systems from the constituents of its substance represented by the economic and social systems. The `Umran as Universal Existence of Mankind is generally materialized in the particular cultures and particularly, in the singular persons both being the fruit of Ijtihād (Theoretical and practical Knowledge) and Jihād (action grounded on these two kinds of knowledge) and their functions and institutions as here interpreted.
This is why these meanings, if construed philosophically, should coincide with the necessary purposes of Shari`ah as fundamental principles of the Universal Religion, because they illustrate the five essential attributes of God as Ideal for human life in its theoretical and practical dimensions [22]:
1-The purpose of reason ãÞÕÏ ÇáÚÞáis not solely concerned with the simple biological power of mind; its religious meaning represents the source of the theoretical and practical knowledge and their conditions and means.
2-The purpose of property ãÞÕÏ ÇáãÇáis not solely concerned with the simple economical power of wealth; its religious meaning represents the material conditions of the subsistence and independence of the person or the means produced by the application of theoretical knowledge,
3- the purpose of honorãÞÕÏ ÇáÚÑÖ is not the simple sexual manners; but its religious meaning represents the moral conditions of the person’s dignity produced and protected by the application of practical knowledge,
4- The purpose of religion ãÞÕÏ ÇáÏíäis not solely concerned with the simple superficial execution of the religious obligations; but its religious meaning is the superior life founded on `Ibada as crowning of theoretical and practical knowledge of `Ayat Allah,
5- And the purpose of Nafs ãÞÕÏ ÇáäÝÓis not concerned with the simple physical conservation of “an-Nafs” as bio-psychological existence; its religious meaning is the fulfillment of the former purposes as conditions of the spiritual life (religion) which implies the full exercise of Ijtihād and Jihād: the enlightened reason and the will as condition of the person as moral being.
This tentative interpretation unveils the deep result of Islamic alternative institutions when they fulfill their functions[23]: the burden of Amanah as Shahādah and Khilāfah in their universal and particular meanings:
A- In Ijtihād, the form of `Umran (Education and State) is anterior to the substance (Economics and Society), because it is concerned essentially with the abstract theoretical and practical knowledge as Tawasi bil-Haqq. The abstract dimension of the purpose an-Nafsu al Mutma`innah as subject of the other purposes and as constituent of al Ummah al-mukallafah bish-shahadah `ala al-`Alamin, obtains as following:
a-The form of `Umran is related to the educational (the purpose of Reason) and political ( the purpose of `Irdh) systems able to produce the person and the community excluded of Al-Khusr.
b-The substance of `Umran is related to the economical ( the purpose of property ) and social ( the purpose of Religion ) systems able to produce the person and the community excluded of Khusr.
B- In Jihād the substance of `Umran is anterior to the form, because it is concerned essentially by the application of the abstract theoretical and practical knowledge as Tawasi bis-Sabr. The concrete dimension of the purpose of an-Nafsul-Mutma`innah, or al-mustakhalfah as subject of the other purposes and as constituent of the Ummah al-Amirah bil-Ma`aruf wan-Nahiyah `An al-Munkir obtains by the same mechanism, but in the reverse direction: first the substance, than the form.
Conclusion:
As consequence of the reinstatement of a spiritual mediation represented by a religious authority (infallible in principle for Shi`ite schools, and in fact for Sunnites) the Islamic continual reformation has failed. Our current attitude towards the West is not unique in its species, but the very structure of our historic attitude to other cultures. This attitude has, doubtless, a positive aspect: openness and universality. But when a culture is overwhelmed by the exogenous influence, it can never develop a proper backbone. This is why its fundamental characteristics cannot obtain in their full meaning and implications.
The reactive attitude of the religious elite and the irrational behavior of the political elite have always entailed a false conception of the principle of accommodation to reality. The simple adoption of the solutions other cultures have invented, instead of the real creations Islam enjoined, seems so far the dominant characteristic of our thought and institutions.
We have tried to demonstrate the insufficiency of any explication grounded on an accusation of Muslims as such. As defense against the Orientalists who accuse Islam, the alternative accusation of Muslims in general is neither fair, nor a satisfactory explanation of the Muslim situation. The Islamic Revolution itself is not immune of responsibility. The Islamic vision of the nature and role of theoretical and practical thought and their institutions was very radical and genuine to be understood by the first generation of Muslims. We should renounce the belief that the first generation was more apt than its successors ones to understand Islam and to achieve the required conditions of its revolution.
Islam itself has been gradually revealed and consequently it cannot be but gradually understood and implemented. The historic experience of fourteen centuries in theoretical and practical thought and in their concrete applications and institutions is absolutely necessary, in order to understand some of the essential implications of this great and genuine revolution. The solutions proposed by our philosophers continue to be only discursive. They were not aware of the modalities, which will render the continual reformation a real historical action.
The obstacles continue to be double after the Sahwa, which has not succeeded in implementing the deep meaning of the civil society as defined by Islam. Our fuqaha‛ are nowadays trying to become politicians without sound awareness of the epistemological and ethical problems entailed by Islamic theoretical revolution as foundation of the divine legislation defended by the moral civil society[24]. Our politicians are likewise trying to become thinkers without sound awareness of the political and ontological systems entailed by the Islamic practical revolution, as foundation of the divine vice-regency defined by the material civil society.
The reformation of our theoretical thought and its institutions should lead to two urgent measures. The first is a doctrinal reformation according to which Usul ad-Din must become an absolute liberal Philosophy of Being or research of Truth and Beauty. It must not continue to be an impotent defense of the dogmatic credo the sole result of which is the spiritual disorder. The second is an institutional reformation according to which the educational and political systems must be liberal and universal.
The reformation of our practical thought and its institutions should also lead to measures of the same kind. The first is a doctrinal reformation according to which Usul al-Fiqh must become an absolute liberal Philosophy of Value or research of Justice and Efficiency. It must cease to be an impotent defense of the dogmatic legal methodology, the unique result of which is the civil disorder. The second is an institutional reformation according to which the economical and social systems must be just and ethical.
[1] The project of al-Ghazali was a pre-critical diagnosis. His refusal of the alien factor paradoxically ended up founding a new synthesis of philosophical and religious thought. He tried to liberate our thought from the conflict between fiqh and taåawwuf and between Kalām and Philosophy. His double critique of Sunnah’s reduction of religion to Fiqh and Shi’a’s reduction to Politics represents a good starting for the renewal of the critique of Sahwa. The project of Ibn Rushd aimed at a restoratory diagnosis. His adoption of the alien factor has paradoxically ended up to a foundation of an absolute separation between the religion as “`ammi” thought and the philosophy as khassi thought. He adopted Aristotelian philosophy as final and universal knowledge.
[2] Ibn Taymiyyah’s project is a critical theoretical diagnosis aiming at overcoming the obstacle of Metaphysics imposed by Ibn Rushd as unique universal theoretical knowledge and Pantheism imposed by Ibn `Arbi as unique universal religion. An alternative theoretical epistemology and ontology was his first concern, but his deep purpose was a new foundation of ethics and religious faith in human freedom and responsibility. Although he practices the superior theoretical Philosophy and Mystics, he excommunicates the factors whereby philosophical and mystical thought provides the thought with a proper historical efficacy. A sterile religious enlightenment cannot but exclude the technical and symbolic efficacies of human reason i.e. science and technical crafts on one hand and esthetics and symbolic efficacy on the other. Ibn Khaldun’s project is an immediate critical practical diagnosis aiming at an overcoming of the obstacle of Meta-history imposed by the Shi`i vjsion and Ibn `Arabi’s mysticism as unique universal practical knowledge. The alternative practical epistemology and axiology was his first concern. Although he practices the superior practical Philosophy and Mystics he excommunicates the factors whereby the philosophical and mystical thought provides the thought with a proper historical efficacy. Sterile religious and scientific enlightenments without technical and symbolic efficacies of reason were the unique result possible of a renewal grounded by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun, on objective and subjective reductions of Ijtihad and Jihad. These are the deep reasons of the failure of the critical school. They may constitute the principal causes of the shortcomings of the Åaäwa, which was profoundly inspired by the critical role of these two philosophers.
[3] This principle is universal: the distance between the potential and the actual is not a distance between two real entities, but a distance between an ideal entity which is nowhere realized and a real potential entity. This phenomenon is twofold: the ethical ideal, for the moral action and the theoretical ideal, for the technical action. The theoretical reason produces through its theoretical imagination an esthetical and technical vision of the being and the practical reason produces through its practical imagination an ethical and political vision of the value. These are the transcendent conditions of civilizational creation. The two forms of Ideal are not simple dreams invented by human imagination. They are the trace of the Divine transcendence. When these Ideals are identified with real entities (Current West and Islamic Past as Ideal) they become source of Idolatry: the divine transcendence would be materialized in idols. This is the real Shirk. The Muslims, both secularist and religious parties, are Mushrikun. They cannot be independent and consequently they are unable to be creative in any level of the theoretical and practical thought, let alone in their symbolic and institutional applications. Our current being is thus reduced to an absolute ontological dependence. The unique possibility of spiritual and temporal liberation must stem from the deepening of Islamic revolutions: the deep meanings of Ijtihād and Jihād.
[4] Euphemistically called modernization: ÊÍÏíË .
[5] Euphemistically called authentication: ÊÃÕíá .
[6] The unity of a community is first and foremost a spiritual and moral principle. Its virtue and power are testified by its phenomenal manifestation i.e. the cultural, economical and political unities. We can measure the quantitative strength of the former by the extension of the latter. But its qualitative virtue can be measured solely by the active action of innovation and creation of the community and of the persons who constitute it. Only some traces of the qualitative dimension of Islamic principle continue to keep the Muslims unite. The qualitative principle itself seems to have faded away. It must be revived. The search for the theoretical conditions of this revivification is the purpose of all modern Islamic authentic thought.
[7] We can define the architectonic Islamic sciences by the outspoken formulation of the antagonistic definition of two couples of disciplines: Falsafah and Kalām on one hand, and Taåawwuf and Fiqh on the other. These two couples have succeeded a mutual neutralization. Our first concern in this paper is the mutual neutralization of the first couple. Indeed, Kalam was reduced to a negative philosophy stemming from an insipid advocating of some formulations of the religious dogma. Falsafa was reduced to the opposite: a negative theology stemming from an insipid advocating of the some formulations of metaphysic dogma. The theoretical reason became an ideological attorney whose unique task was the defense of the existent doxa without any ambition to seek the truth. How can we seek the truth when we believe that we possess its final formulation? But how can we be true Muslims if we don’t see that this belief means the absolute negation of al-Ghayb? The seeking of truth is infinite because the Ghaib is impossible to exhaust. This is why Ibrahim `alayhi as-Salam, has not given a final answer to his question: his question is related to the essence of God, the faith in his existence being beyond all forms of doubt.
[8] The basic hygienic conditions of Islamic revolution materialize this difficulty more than any other further commentary: the hygienic vision of the body, as condition of the religious obligations is absolutely impossible to meet in the Islamic life, without a new vision of the city and the social organizations.
[9] The thoughts and institutions borrowed are not “`ala an-Nafyil-asli” or “`ala al-Bara`a al-Asliyyah” i.e. according to a natural state; but they are a cultural product which expresses a vision of an “objektives Geist” the adoption of which needs analysis and interpretation. Every Istiåäāb al Äāl is therefore wittingly or unwittingly a spiritual dismissal of one’s proper intellectual and ethical effort, when operated without being preceded by a philosophical investigation.
[10] This categorical statement has nothing to do with the negation of genuine Islamic thought. It concerns the historical forms of alleged philosophical schools like Ikhwan as-Åafa‛, or the historical behavior of the political and legal elites who have adopted the existent institutions without seeking to fructify the concepts defined by this very genuine Islamic thought, which has been ignored or neglected, provided it offered any far fetched justification of the borrowing . The first concern was the urgent response to the improvised situations and consequently the refusal of any serious theoretical foundation of the institutional requirements of the Islamic Revolution. They have forgotten that the theoretical foundation of the Islamic Revolution (Mekkean Qur’an) has lasted almost 10 years before the beginning of the practical implementation of this theoretical vision (Medinean Qur’an).
[11] This definition of Usul ad-Din reduced to the defensive Kalām has prompted Ibn Khaldun to dismiss it. This “`Ilm” is no more necessary, because the `Aqidah after its domination needs no more to be defended.
[12] This eclectic syncretism in Usul al Din and in Usul al Fiqh adopted by the reformers has aggravated the problem for two reasons. First, because the adoption has a unique motivation: to help the continual intellectual and institutional borrowing of alien sources and hence to substitute the innovation by the openness to alien influences. Second, every synthesis of kalām schools produces another school, and every synthesis of fiqh doctrines adjuncts another doctrine. Thus this syncretism will never resolve the problem of the theoretical and practical tahreef.
[13] Al `Asr: æÇáÚÕÑ* Åä ÇáÇäÓÇä áÝí ÎÓÑ* ÅáÇ ÇáÐíä ÂãäæÇ æÚãáæÇ ÇáÕÇáÍÇÊ æÊæÇÕæÇ ÈÇáÍÞ æÊæÇÕæÇ ÈÇáÕÈÑ
[14] Historically the two oppositions have practically disappeared, even if they marginally lasted in some peripheral Islamic countries. But the core of their thought have been adopted by the two great parties of Islam: Ash`arism and Bahshamism stemmed from this adoption of the mu`tazilitism’s vision by Sunnah and Shi`ah: the role of theoretical Reason and theoria. Hanbalism and Isma`islism stemmed from the adoption by them of Kharijism’s vision: the role of practical reason and action.
[15] The five possibilities of faith in relation of which Islam define itself proposing an Irja`I attitude towards their evaluation, in order to ground the principle of religious tolerance: ÇáÍÌ 17:" Åä ÇáÐíä ÂãäæÇ æÇáÐíä åÇÏæÇ æÇáÕÇÈÆíä æÇáäÕÇÑì æÇáãÌæÓ æÇáÐíä ÃÔÑßæÇ Åä Çááå íÝÕá Èíäåã íæã ÇáÞíÇãÉ Åä Çááå Úáì ßá ÔíÁ ÔåíÏ"
[16] These two concepts are defined in `Ali `Imran: Tahreef as limit concept of theoretical thought construed as arbitrary epistemological Interpretation and Jahiliyya as limit concept of practical thought construed as arbitrary axiological Interpretation.
[17] The terms Book and Nubuwwah are not haphazardly accompanied by the terms Hikma or Hukm in all qur`anic verses. The Book and Nubuwwah hint to the revealed knowledge or the super natural source of our knowledge of Shari`ah. The Hikma and Hukm hint to the natural knowledge or to the natural source of our knowledge of Tabi`ah. Being the final formulation of the Universal Religion which is one in all historic religions, the Qur`an must be a reminder of the two sources without pretending to be an alternative substitute to the investigation of each of them in the five subject matter defined in it: the nature, the shari`ah, the human history, the person, and the book itself as “‛ayat” or “kalimat” Allah.
[18] We use this concept in its Kantian meaning: rational foundation of any given beyond its factual existence.
[19] We continue the philosophical presentation of the two dimensions of reason. We begin with the theoretical aspect. Religiously, the practical aspect has the preeminence. But our analysis of the concept of Ijtihād is conceived of by comparison with the concept of Jihād: this why we apply the five dimensions introducing in both two comparatives (Kabir and Saghir) as median between their two superlatives (Akbar and Asghar) connotations.
[20] Al-`Asr: ÇáÐíä ÂãäæÇ.... æÊæÇÕæÇ ÈÇáÍÞ.
[21] Al-`Asr:æÚãáæÇ ÇáÕÇáÍÇÊ.....æÊæÇÕæÇ ÈÇáÕÈÑ .
[22] These five essential attributes are: existence, life, knowledge, power and will. The existence being, for God, identical with the essence, it represents the very reality of God: ÇáÐÇÊ. These attributes constitute the ends the means of which are the purposes of Shari`a. So, man can be khalifah because he has a quantum of these essential attributes: existence, life, knowledge, power and will. The respective purposes of Shari`a are: Nafs, Religion, Reason, Property, and Honor. Without full existence, superior life, knowledge, real power, and free will, Nafs, Religion, Reason, Property and Honor have neither material nor actual reality.
[23] This is why these purposes are both Human Rights and Human Duties. They are Rights towards the religious and political authorities. They are duties of every person towards itself, the community and God.
[24] The moral civil society is a notion we have coined in order to define the role of social self-defense of the ends of superior spiritual life i.e. the purposes of Shari`ah as both Rights and Duties. The material civil society corresponds to the social self-defense of the means of this same superior spiritual life, i.e. the conditions of possibilities of these Rights and Duties. Civil society with this double connotation exists as national and international institution. At the national level it protects the citizen against the abuses of the national spiritual and temporal authorities. At the international level it protects nations and minorities against the abuses of the hegemonic imperialisms.
ÇáãæÞÚ áÇ íÊÈäì ãÖÇãíä ÇáÅÚáÇäÇÊ æíÚæá Úáì æÚí ÇáÒæÇÑ ÇáßÑÇã